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Abstract
The ability to reverse the most advanced software protection schemes is a critical step in mitigating
malicious code attacks. Unfortunately, the analyst side seems to be losing in the ongoing arms race
between malware developers and reverse engineers. Obfuscation that takes advantage of a virtual-
machine like architecture has proven to be one of the most difficult to deal with. Virtual-machine
packers are able to hide the intentions of programs they are applied to and are resistant to formerly
effective unpacking techniques. Others have proposed methods to deal with such complex protec-
tions, but they are often tedious, expensive, and/or inflexible. We propose a novel approach to
automate the analysis process of virtualization protected executables. Our design avoids many pit-
falls and performance issues of dynamic-analysis systems by only employing static program-analysis
techniques and emphasizing work-reuse and generality in order to maintain efficiency, flexibility,
and accessibility, for even novice analysts. The proof-of-concept system we have developed shows
promise for the future of virtual-machine protected software analysis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Software packers, obfuscators and protectors are most prevalent in malware: viruses, worms, tro-
jans, etc., but can also be used in commercial software. In either application, their goal is to
prevent, or at least hinder, analysis of the underlying code that they protect. In practice, they are
almost exclusively used as a form of obfuscation for nefarious purposes. Estimates suggest that the
percentage of malware that is packed has dramatically increased, over a short period of time, to
upwards of 79% [8]. Furthermore, with new record-numbers of malware samples each year [6], the
need for automation grows stronger. Being able to triage a large number of samples quickly is a
great advantage. Monetary incentives have ensured advancements on both sides. However, as of
late the analyst side seems to have stalled when it comes to certain more advanced incarnations of
protection. Without means of reversing said types of protectors, it becomes extremely difficult to
protect ourselves against malware, and any hope of tracking down the cyber-criminals whom are
responsible is dramatically reduced.
In this paper we take the first step towards automatically unpacking VM-protected code through
completely static methods. We take advantage of modern program analysis techniques such as con-
straint solving, along with common structures that are often present in existing VM implementations.
The system automatically finds references to virtualized instructions and reverse engineers the dis-
patching code to find the opcodes of the virtualized instruction set and lift their handlers to an
intermediate representation for further processing. These steps are crucial to completely reversing
such a complex protection scheme and it eliminates much of the tedium of manually analyzing the
same protected code. Furthermore, we are able to bypass many of the shortcomings of automated
dynamic systems which are often incomplete and more easily evaded.
1.1 Thesis Overview
In Chapter 1 we present the overall problem and motivation of the paper, as well as some background
knowledge needed for the sections that follow. Chapter 2 goes over related works. In Chapter 3
we discuss the design decisions and assumptions made in developing the system we propose as a
solution, along with the advantages and trade-offs that come with them. Chapter 4 explains our
overall approach to the problem. Next, Chapter 5 explains how the system was implemented. In
Chapter 6 we evaluate the validity and performance of our system, and Chapter 7 discusses possible
future work. In Chapter 8 we draw conclusions and end with any closing remarks. Appendix A is
primarily a code listing for the VM-obfuscation we wrote for testing.
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1.2 Packer Evolution
Packers are constantly evolving. At a high level, they simply take in an executable binary and
output another executable binary that is now smaller and/or more difficult to analyze. The first
generation of packers compressed or encrypted the code portion of the executable before re-adding
it as a new section of the binary. The original code section was then replaced with a small unpacking
stub, responsible for reversing the prior obfuscation step, at run-time. The actual algorithm used
for obfuscation can vary greatly: anything from simple XOR schemes and complex custom ciphers,
to off-the-shelf cryptographic or compression algorithms.
Malware analysts developed techniques that are fairly successful in dealing with the most basic
forms of run-time protectors. The most widely accepted automated-solutions involve detecting when
the original unpacked-code resides in memory and dumping it back to disk for further inspection
[30, 32]. It is worth noting that this only works because the entire unobfuscated program is in
memory at one time, so the trick is to detect when that occurs.
In response to such effective counter-measures, the opposition created several new types of
advanced-packers. Such protectors might involve breaking the original program up into multiple
processes, threads, and/or binaries, which can then communicate over various covert channels or
even debug each other, to impede analysis. Others might inject malicious code into other process, or
create hollow or shadow processes; some even have their own custom loading procedures (which the
operating system is typically responsible for), destroy the import table, dynamically load external
code sources, etc. However, this paper focuses on the virtualization packer, or VM-Packer.
1.3 Virtual-Machine Packers
Obfuscators taking advantage of virtualization technology are some of the most widely used, as
well as, difficult to analyze, forms of protection available today. The underlying architecture shares
themes common with virtual machines and interpreted programming languages. The initial code
segment is first recompiled from the binary’s native instruction set (ISA), most commonly x86, into
another “target-ISA”. This instruction set can vary greatly between implementations and can even
change between different runs of the same protector. VM-packers can utilize practically any kind
of ISA imaginable. This includes both RISC and CISC inspired schemes. It can be as complete
as the author would like and/or is capable of producing, and may have components generated at
random. Next, similar to the first generation of packer, the entry-point of the executable is replaced
by an interpreter for the newly generated bytecode. This allows each VM-instruction to be processed
individually, so the entirety of the unobfuscated code never resides in memory at the same time.
Without the entirety of the original code in view at once, it cannot be dumped to disk for later
analysis.
1.3.1 Common Terms and Architecture
The term Virtual-Machine Packer comes from the internal architecture’s likeness to a virtual ma-
chine. While each packer can vary greatly, in practice many implementations share a common overall
architecture and certain terms are often used when talking about them:
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VM Context
The context is basically the VM’s state which persists throughout the lifetime of the virtualized
program. It is updated by executing virtualized instructions. Each implementation of of a Virtual-
Machine Packer may be unique, but common types of information stored in a VM’s context might
include, a virtual instruction pointer or program counter (VIP/VPC), registers, flags, stack(s), etc.
A VM’s context usually is implemented as a simple structure, like a C struct, and will often mimic
that of a real hardware-CPU.
Dispatcher
The dispatcher or dispatching code, has the job of parsing the raw virtualized bytecode and de-
termining which virtual instruction is to be executed. It is responsible for interpreting the ISA
encoding, translating VM-bytecode to native instructions, and typically is called at least once for
every VM-instruction. This portion of code might also perform tasks such as advance the VIP/VPC.
Handlers
A VM-instruction handler refers to the native code which is called as a result of a specific virtual
instruction being interpreted. It is primarily responsible for changing the state of the VM according
to what virtual instruction is called. There is often, but not necessarily, a one-to-one correspondence
between VM-instructions and handlers. Being able to determine the mapping of bytecode to handler
is essential for reversing a virtualization protector.
Architecture
The packed bytecode-program is generally stored in a data segment of a portable executable (PE),
the standard executable format of binaries. From there, the dispatcher code will read instruction-by-
instruction, calling the appropriate instruction-handler and updating the VM-context accordingly
throughout. Because the obfuscated-program is never unpacked in memory at once, this form of
protection is immune to unpackers which try to dump memory images to disk when certain conditions
are met. Furthermore, due to a single original-instruction being translated into several packed-
instructions, it makes manual step-through analysis with a debugger very tedious. Please refer to
Appendix A for an example implementation of a very basic VM, named StackVM, implemented in
MASM assembler.
3
Chapter 2
Related Works
Many researchers have developed techniques to deal with malware packers. One of the first solutions
was OllyBonE [10]. It is a plug-in for the popular debugger OllyDbg [11]. It uses a kernel driver
to allow the user to select sections of memory to “Break ON Execute”. The idea is to have a
malware analyst mark the memory segment where the obfuscated code is to be unpacked. Then,
when the control flow jumps to the original entry point (OEP), the debugger will break and allow
the unobfuscated code to be dumped to disk.
PolyUnpack [32] compares a static model of the original executable to a dynamically generated
model. The differences between the models are used to identify hidden code. Renovo [29] and
Omniunpack [30] automatically unpack malware by executing the packed program, either on bare-
metal hardware or in an emulator, while keeping track of memory-writes. When a memory location
that was written to, is set to be executed, that code is then typically considered to be unpacked-code
and is dumped to disk.
All of these techniques are effective against the first generation of packers, which unpack them-
selves into data segments and then execute the unobfuscated code from memory. However, they
are relatively ineffective against the most advanced of protection technologies, such as VM-packers,
where the unobfuscated code never resides in memory all at once.
The system we are proposing also leverages classic program analysis techniques, applying them
specifically to the problem of VM-Packers. Automated theorem provers have been used for quite
some time in the program analysis field [22]. Also, recently, Vanegue et al. have explored the use of
SMT solvers for security purposes such as vulnerability checking and exploit generation [35]. Rolles
has detailed input-crafting using symbolic execution and constraint-solvers to break cryptosystems
statically [16]. Our system uses a constraint solver to glean information regarding VM-protections.
2.1 VM Obfuscators
Existing work on analyzing Virtual-Machine Packers can be split into two main categories based on
the types of analyses used: static or dynamic.
Static reverse engineering
Static reverse engineering typically involves having a skilled specialist analyze the output of a disas-
sembler, such as IDA Pro [5], and manually draw conclusions about how the particular VM-Packer
works. This is an extremely time-consuming and expensive process. Since relatively few people
4
have the skills required to do such work, and the process itself is very tedious. This must also
be repeated for each instance of packer. Rolles has published several works which detail some of
the techniques and processes he uses to reverse industrial-grade protections, and how one might
be able to use compiler theory and optimizations for deobfuscation. [31] provides a general method
for reverse-engineering the whole family of protectors manually. [3] explains unpacking a custom
packer using an IDA processor module. He also has a series of articles on reverse-engineering bi-
naries packed with VMProtect [20], [12–14, 19]. These kinds of methods are the most prevalent in
commercial applications and are the most reliable approach we have currently for dealing with the
most sophisticated software protections.
Automated dynamic analysis
Automated dynamic analysis will often take advantage of traces, generally produced by using some
kind of virtual environment or emulator to execute the binary in question under instrumentation.
Sharif et al. took advantage of traces from a modified Qemu [15] build and used memory access
patterns to automatically learn several features of malware emulators [33]. They were able to ex-
tract many structural details as well as information regarding the VM’s instruction set through these
methods. Coogan et al. also used traces. However, they took a semantics-based approach to deobfus-
cating instruction-traces, working backwards from system-calls [25]. Their goal was observational-
equivalence, while also providing insight into the original unobfuscated-instructions.
Hybrid
Beyond academic research, in practice, most analysts take a hybrid approach. There have been
works published on reverse-engineering Code Virtualizer [1] using both dynamic and static analysis
techniques simultaneously [4, 7].
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Chapter 3
Design
Our work comes out of the need for a way to handle VM-packed binaries more efficiently. There
are usually only a handful of skilled-individuals, who do not always publish their methods, capable
of dealing with the most advanced of software-protections. VM-protections are typically broken
by manually reverse engineering each new VM-implementation. However, such methods are inac-
cessible to the average user and are often both costly and tedious. Some dynamic systems have
been developed to address the challenge; however, they are often inefficient and incomplete. This
is especially true in the case of virtualization packers. We have designed an automated system
that leverages purely static program-analysis techniques to aid in reverse engineering of VM-based
protection schemes. This system enables even novice analysts to understand the VM-interpreter in
a time and cost-efficient manner.
3.1 Static Analysis
Unlike many of the current state-of-the-art virtual-machine analysis systems, our system was de-
signed to use only static program analysis techniques. Thus, no instructions of the binaries that are
analyzed are executed during the analysis process. This is especially important when dealing with
malicious executables because there is much less risk of damage being done to friendly systems.
The nature of static analysis allows for a more complete view of the code to be analyzed. In
dynamic analysis systems, only the code paths that are executed can be analyzed, and reproducibility
can be a problem. It can be difficult to get certain code paths to execute deterministically and branch
decisions are often unclear. In the static-case everything that is visible to the user is processed.
Additionally, unimportant portions of code that are executed many times over, which are ex-
tremely common in this kind of architecture, result in considerable time and resources being wasted.
The set up code, dispatcher and decoding steps are repeated for each virtual instruction, resulting
in a great deal of time wasted on code that is uninteresting. Static analysis allows us to avoid many
of the inefficiencies that accompany dynamic-analysis. If we were required to execute code paths
of the executable there might be considerable overhead and time spent on instructions unrelated to
the portions we are interested in. This fact will often make static analysis techniques much faster
to perform than dynamic-analysis techniques.
Moreover, we can avoid many execution and environment related pitfalls such as the myriad of
anti-execution, anti-debugger [26], and anti-VM [27] tricks available. That is methods for avoiding:
execution, analysis within a debugger, and analysis within virtual environments such as Qemu [15],
which are necessary for many dynamic-analysis systems. A drawback however, is that there is
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less information available when using pure static analysis, compared to the wealth of information
available concerning code that is actually being executed, like in the dynamic case. To deal with
this, many of the values in a static model must be symbolic or variable in nature. This also causes
manual analysis to require more tedium or expertise in a similar scenario.
3.2 Assumptions
When analyzing binary code it is important to be able to properly disassemble the code sections
of whatever native code you are dealing with. This is a particularly hard problem to solve, and
has been compared to the classic halting-problem [28]. It becomes especially difficult when working
against an active adversary that might be using anti-disassembly tricks [21]. In our work we have
assumed that we are able to reliably disassemble the executables in question. Since our focus is on
reversing virtualization obfuscators we naturally have only designed our system to handle the issues
that arise with that specific family of obfuscation. We have no provisions for dealing with even the
most basic of other-forms of obfuscation and leave that to other works. Our system is meant to
be a proof-of-concept for automated static-analysis techniques applied to software protections using
virtualization.
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Chapter 4
Approach
The goal of our system is to provide automated analysis of virtualization protected binaries, and
provide reports that can be useful for reverse engineering, even to a novice user. A schematic of our
system can be seen in Figure 4. Our system takes a binary executable as input and outputs details
of the virtual machine in question to aid in further analysis of the protected code.
Disassembly	  
IR	  Li.ing	  
Iden2ﬁca2on	   Seman2c	  
Extrac2on	  
Transforma2on	  Op2miza2on	  
Output	   Recompila2on	  
Front-End 
Core 
Analysis 
Back-End 
Figure 4.1: Overview
The front-end of our system reads the binary input file and then disassembles and lifts it to an
intermediate representation, explained in Section 4.1. The core of our system analyzes and extracts
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the relevant details of the VM implementation and then applies any number of transformations and
optimizations to deobfuscate the translated code. This is outlined in the Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4.
Finally, the back-end of our system is responsible for providing an output that is useful to the user
by displaying the relevant information explained in Section 4.4.
Implementation details of the system can be found in Section 5.
4.1 Disassembly and IR Lifting
First, we must convert the binary data into assembly instructions using a disassembler. The goal
of disassembly is to translate raw binary data into human-readable mnemonics. Second, we lift the
code segments to an intermediate representation (IR) to extract some semantics of the disassembly.
Lifting the code in this manner makes the code easier to work with in the core analysis portion of
our system. The IR also shows the system side-effects far more explicitly than native assembly. For
example, changes to the flags register, type conversions, endianess, and temporary computations are
made obvious.
addr 0x401013 @asm "cmp $0x1,%al"
label pc_0x401013
T_t:u8 = low:u8(R_EAX:u32) - 1:u8
R_CF:bool = low:u8(R_EAX:u32) < 1:u8
R_OF:bool =
high:bool((low:u8(R_EAX:u32) ^ 1:u8) & (low:u8(R_EAX:u32) ^ T_t:u8))
R_AF:bool = 0x10:u8 == (0x10:u8 & (T_t:u8 ^ low:u8(R_EAX:u32) ^ 1:u8))
R_PF:bool =
~low:bool(T_t:u8 >> 7:u8 ^ T_t:u8 >> 6:u8 ^ T_t:u8 >> 5:u8 ^ T_t:u8 >> 4:u8 ^
T_t:u8 >> 3:u8 ^ T_t:u8 >> 2:u8 ^ T_t:u8 >> 1:u8 ^ T_t:u8)
R_SF:bool = high:bool(T_t:u8)
R_ZF:bool = 0:u8 == T_t:u8
Figure 4.2: IR representation of cmp instruction
As an example, the bytes 0x3c01, would be disassembled as cmp al, 0x1, and lifted as the IR
as seen in Figure 4.2. Here, R CF, R OF, R AF, R PF, R SF, and R ZF make up the flag register,
and T t is a temporary variable, since the result of the cmp instruction’s subtraction is not stored.
4.2 Identification of Common Constructs
Once the code is in a standardized format we are able to search for common constructs in the VM-
interpreter code. At this point we are just simply iterating and pattern matching. For example, a
series of conditional jumps is often used in VM-packer implementations as a simple VM-instruction
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decoder, mapping VM-encoded bytes to their appropriate handlers. If you were to disassemble a
program packed by such a protector it might resemble Figure 4.3. In this trivial example, the current
VM-instruction is being compared to numerical opcodes; when there is a match the corresponding
instruction handler is invoked.
.text:00401013 cmp curr_vm_inst, 1
.text:00401015 jnz short loc_401021
.text:00401017 call 1_handler
.text:0040101C jmp next_vm_instruction
.text:00401021 ; ----------------------------------------------------
.text:00401021
.text:00401021 loc_401021:
.text:00401021 cmp curr_vm_inst, 2
.text:00401023 jnz short loc_40102F
.text:00401025 call 2_handler
.text:0040102A jmp next_vm_instruction
.text:0040102F ; ----------------------------------------------------
.text:0040102F
.text:0040102F loc_40102F:
.text:0040102F cmp curr_vm_inst, 3
.text:00401031 jnz short loc_40103D
.text:00401033 call 3_handler
.text:00401038 jmp next_vm_instruction
.text:0040103D ...
Figure 4.3: Simple vm-instruction decoder
4.2.1 Semantic Constraint Solving
Our goal is to search for common constructs which yield valuable information about the vm-
interpreter. However, if we were to do pattern matching alone, there would be far too much noise
in the tool’s output, due to the possible generality in certain code constructs, exemplified in Fig-
ure 4.3. Furthermore, it would be very difficult to create a system that uses pattern matching alone
to identify many constructs without becoming extremely bloated and inefficient.
Instead, we leverage the semantics of the instructions along with a constraint solver, to increase
our ability to identify certain structures with a higher level of granularity and efficiency than pattern
matching alone. The sets of constraints are generated at run-time, and are dependent on what kind
of structure is in question.
Resolving Virtualized Code References
One application of using a constraint solver in this manner is in resolving references to the ob-
fuscated code. However, this can be quite difficult to do statically. Consider the case of opcode
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handling. Typically the current vm-instruction, either residing in memory or in a register, is com-
pared to potential values so that the appropriate handler may recognized and invoked, as shown
in Figure 4.3. If the vm-instruction is in a general-purpose register or scratch memory location it
is very difficult to know when references to the same register or memory location are referring to
vm-specific values or arbitrary ones. However, if one utilizes the context of such references it can
be narrowed down significantly. For instance, Figure 4.4 illustrates a common possible-idiom for
loading a vm-instruction into the general-purpose register eax:
xor eax, eax
xor ecx, ecx
lea esi, code
mov cx, [vpc]
add esi, ecx
mov al, [esi]
Figure 4.4: Loading vm-instruction into general-purpose register eax
At the end of this snippet, eax contains the next vm-instruction. However, this observation is
only evident immediately after the last mov instruction. If we were to choose another arbitrary
instruction following this code this may no longer be true. We can check this condition at any
point by using a constraint solver if we know the address of the beginning of the virtualized code
segment, and optionally, the address or value of the virtual program counter/instruction pointer. In
our implementation we make this a user-input, but others have shown the process of determining
this address to be automatable, and is often fairly simple to do manually, even for a novice [33].
Depending on the specific construct, our system outputs a set of constraints which can be solved by
a constraint solver such as STP [17]. In the case above, we might solve for goal where: goal : bool :=
eax == code+ [vpc]. For a simple case of what an STP input might look like, refer to Figure 4.5.
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% free variables:
R_EAX_5 : BITVECTOR(32);
goal_51292 : BITVECTOR(1);
mem_array_51395 : ARRAY BITVECTOR(32) OF BITVECTOR(8);
% end free variables.
ASSERT(
0bin1 =
(LET R_ECX_52095_0 =
(0hex0000@((0bin00000000 @ mem_array_51395[0hex00413052])|
(((0bin00000000 @ mem_array_51395[0hex00413053]) << 8)[15:0])))
IN
(LET R_ESI_52096_1 = BVPLUS(32, 0hex00403025,R_ECX_52095_0) IN
(LET R_EAX_52099_2 = ((R_EAX_5)[31:8]@mem_array_51395[R_ESI_52096_1]) IN
(LET T_t_52101_3 = BVSUB(8, (R_EAX_52099_2[7:0]),0hexff) IN
(LET R_ZF_52102_4 = IF (0hex00=T_t_52101_3) THEN 0bin1 ELSE 0bin0 ENDIF IN
((~(~(R_ZF_52102_4))|(0bin0&goal_51292))&
(~(~(~(R_ZF_52102_4)))|(0bin0&goal_51292))))))))
);
QUERY(FALSE);
COUNTEREXAMPLE;
Figure 4.5: Example constraint solver input
In the case of the commercial packer VMProtect [20], we can check if eax is referencing the
virtualized code by solving for: goal : bool := eax == [esi− 1].
4.3 Extracting Semantics
Once we have identified the structures we are interested in, we extract the relevant semantics. In
our running example, this translates to the virtual instruction set’s opcodes and respective han-
dlers. This is done fairly easily given the identification steps along with the the expressiveness of
the intermediate representation. Determining the mapping of vm-bytecode to x86 vm-instruction
handlers is essential for unpacking a protected binary. Other possible uses for the process would
include extracting vm-context specifics. The raw disassembly of our simple decoder from section 4.2
is shown in Figure 4.6
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.text:00401013 cmp al, 1
.text:00401015 jnz short loc_401021
.text:00401017 call sub_401125
.text:0040101C jmp loc_401118
.text:00401021 ; ----------------------------------------------------
.text:00401021
.text:00401021 loc_401021:
.text:00401021 cmp al, 2
.text:00401023 jnz short loc_40102F
.text:00401025 call sub_401148
.text:0040102A jmp loc_401118
.text:0040102F ; ----------------------------------------------------
.text:0040102F
.text:0040102F loc_40102F:
.text:0040102F cmp al, 3
.text:00401031 jnz short loc_40103D
.text:00401033 call sub_40116B
.text:00401038 jmp loc_401118
.text:0040103D ...
Figure 4.6: The raw disassembly of a simple decoding idiom
The opcode-handler mapping is fairly obvious. If vm-instruction 1 is encountered then the
decoder will call the subroutine at memory address 0x401125, 2 would result in the subroutine at
0x401148, and so on.
In the case of VMProtect [20], the fetch-decode portion is a essentially a load and jmp table
offset, which when viewed in a disassembler would look like Figure 4.7. We are able to extract the
bytecode-handler mapping by knowing that esi effectively serves as the virtual instruction pointer
from which a byte is loaded, and by looking at the jmp target located at the memory address
0x004C2080. In this case, there is a table of function pointers to the handling functions beginning
at memory address 0x4C2171.
004C207A mov al, [esi]
004C207C movzx eax, al
004C207F inc esi
004C2080 jmp dword [eax*4+0x4c2171]
Figure 4.7: VMProtect’s fetch-decode snippet
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4.4 Post-Processing: Deobfuscation, Optimization, and
Output
At this stage of the analysis, we have obtained semantic information about the vm-interpreter
and virtual instruction set. Now, we can begin the deobfuscation, optimizations, and output a
useful result to the user. Given the mapping from VM-bytecode to the handler-code, we begin
deobfuscating each handler’s subroutine. The exact techniques that must be applied are fairly
subjective and is mostly outside the scope of this paper. We will show some example methods
that are particularly effective for these types of protectors. For instance, Figure 4.8 shows a toy
bytecode-program obfuscated with StackVM, from Appendix A.
0x05 0xCD 0xAB ; vmov r0, 0xABCD
0x01 ; vpush r0
0x05, 0x011, 0x011 ; mov r0, 0x1111
0x0B ; vxchg r0, r1
0x02 ; vpop r0
Figure 4.8: Example StackVM bytecode
Using the bytecode-handler mapping extracted in previous steps, we can replace the bytecode
portion of virtual instructions with their corresponding handler subroutine-bodies. After direct
replacement the user is left with something similar to Figure 4.9.
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xor edx, edx
mov dx, ABCDh
mov word ptr [vr0], dx
sub vsp, 2
mov ax, [vr0]
lea ebx, stack
xor edi, edi
mov di, vsp
add edi, ebx
mov word ptr[edi], ax
xor edx, edx
mov dx, 1111h
mov word ptr [vr0], dx
mov ax, [vr0]
mov bx, [vr1]
mov word ptr [vr1], ax
mov word ptr [vr0], bx
lea ebx, stack
xor edi, edi
mov di, vsp
add edi, ebx
mov ax, [edi]
mov word ptr[vr0], ax
add vsp, 2
Figure 4.9: Example StackVM bytecode after direct replacement
Figure 4.9 is similar to the output of a dynamic-analysis tool if you traced the execution of
the obfuscated program. However, in our static system we are able to skip having to analyze and
process the control-flow code that is quite sizeable in this type of obfuscator. While we now have
fairly straight-line code, which is a significant improvement over the distributed control-flow of the
original program, the code’s actual meaning is difficult to discern and is quite inefficient and lengthy.
There are numerous options from this point to begin the deobfuscation process. We begin by
using a number of compiler optimizations. Then, a few heuristic replacements are applied to the
resulting code in order to get very close to the ideal unobfuscated code. Others first proposed the
use of compiler optimizations for this purpose in 2008 [4, 31] in dealing with VMProtect and Code
Virtualizer [1]. Constant folding and constant propagation allow the substitution of variables for
known-constants when the variable in question is constant at the time the expression is evaluated.
In the case of the running example, after constant folding and constant propagation the user is
left with Figure 4.10.
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xor edx, edx
mov dx, ABCDh
mov word ptr [vr0], ABCDh
sub vsp, 2
mov ax, ABCDh
lea ebx, stack
xor edi, edi
mov di, vsp
add edi, ebx
mov word ptr[edi], ABCDh
xor edx, edx
mov dx, 1111h
mov word ptr [vr0], 1111h
mov ax, 1111h
mov bx, [vr1]
mov word ptr [vr1], 1111h
mov word ptr [vr0], bx
lea ebx, stack
xor edi, edi
mov di, vsp
add edi, ebx
mov ax, [edi]
mov word ptr[vr0], ax
add vsp, 2
Figure 4.10: Example StackVM bytecode after constant folding and constant propagation
At this point we are able to apply dead code elimination to get rid of the statements that are no
longer necessary. Dead code is simply the set of instructions that are executed but do not affect the
end result or whose results are no longer referenced after they are executed. Peephole optimization
is an optimization technique that replaces short sequences of instructions within a small window
or “peephole”, with more efficient, or in this case less-obfuscated, instructions. This step allows us
to do some heuristic-based deobfuscation dependent on the specific implementation of VM we are
dealing with. In the example, we removed several instructions that became dead code and are able to
eliminate the virtual stack completely through peephole optimizations. After dead code elimination
and peephole-optimization we are left with Figure 4.11.
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mov bx, [vr1]
mov word ptr [vr1], 1111h
mov word ptr [vr0], bx
mov word ptr [vr0], ABCDh
Figure 4.11: Example StackVM bytecode after dead code elimination and peephole-optimization
Now that we have reduced the size of the code considerably, from twenty-four to four instructions
in our running example, and effectively deobfuscated the code, we must repeat the process for the
entire virtualized bytecode program. This will essentially leave the user with an unobfuscated
program.
At this point, we provide the user with a useful output. A classical step would be to “recompile”
the new intermediate representation into an executable, but this is somewhat outside of our goals.
In our system, we simply print the results to standard output, which can also easily be written to a
file. However, if one were so inclined it would be fairly straightforward to generate a new executable,
effectively unpacking the original-obfuscated executable.
By following this approach, we created a system that allows relatively novice users to perform
analysis on a very sophisticated set of software protections in an efficient manner. Furthermore,
as the set of common constructs and post-processing transformation grows, the number of specific
implementations that can be dealt with in the future does as well. We believe that this generalization
and work-reuse is a great asset for a system such as ours. In a field that can be quite tedious and
extremely expensive to start from scratch on each new project, this system could be very valuable.
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Chapter 5
Implementation
There are three main stages in our system: front-end processing, core analysis, and back-end output.
Our system builds upon the Binary Analysis Platform (BAP) [24] framework, the successor of
Vine [18], the static analysis component from the BitBlaze platform [34]. We chose this framework
because it provides several nice book-keeping and general analysis features out-of-the-box, including
explicit endianess. It is well-documented, and along with its predecessors, is fairly well-known
and used throughout many program analysis, reverse-engineering and malware analysis-focused,
academic research groups.
Our system was implemented for IA-32 (x86), the most popular architecture for this kind of work
and malware in general, but the techniques themselves are platform-independent. Other architec-
tures are outside the scope of this paper and were not tested. All development and experiments were
done on Debian 6.0.7 Squeeze with an Intel R© CoreTM i5-3210M CPU with a 2.50 GHz clock and 2
GB of RAM. All analysis code is written in OCaml, with many test binaries written in MASM and
IA-32 (x86).
5.1 Front-End
In the first step, we use BAP’s linear sweep disassembler on the input binaries. Disassembly is
the process by which binary data is interpreted as native instructions; the output mnemonics also
happen to be more descriptive to a human.
The next step is to convert the disassembly into a form that is more suitable for analysis and
transformations, an intermediate representation. BAP’s asmir module lifts the assembly into BAP’s
Intermediate Language (BIL). This provides us with a good starting point to perform our analyses
and transformations because it is a fairly well-documented intermediate representation. Figure 5.1
shows the formalization of the IR, but for the full specification please refer to the BAP Handbook [23].
5.2 Core Analysis
From the IR we are able to construct a control-flow graph (CFG). Refer to Figure 5.1 for an example
CFG of a simple “Hello World!” program. For reasons discussed in Section 5.4, before we continue
the CFG must be cleaned up by removing certain components that BAP has trouble with, such
as: indirect jmp instructions, graph meta data, comments, and special nodes. In order to analyze
the code segments, we transform the CFG into an abstract syntax tree (AST) and begin the core
analysis phase. The identification of the constructs common to virtual-machine protections, as well
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program ::= stmt*
stmt ::= var := exp | jmp(exp) | cjmp(exp,exp,exp)
| halt(exp) | assert(exp) | label label kind | special(string)
exp ::= load(exp, exp, exp, τreg) | store(exp, exp, exp,exp,τreg ) | exp ♦b exp
| ♦u exp | var | lab(string) | integer | cast(cast kind,τreg,exp)
| let var = exp in exp | unknown(string, τ) | name(exp)
label kind ::= integer | string
cast kind ::= unsigned | signed | high | low
var ::= (string, idv, τ)
♦b ::= +,−, ∗, /, /s,mod,mods,,,a,&, |,⊕,==, ! =, <,≤, <s,≤s
♦u ::= − (unary minus), ∼ (bit-wise not)
value ::= integer | memory | string | ⊥
integer ::= n (:τreg)
memory ::= { integer → integer, integer → integer, . . . } (:τmem)
τ ::= τreg | τmem
τmem ::= mem t(τreg) | array t(τreg, τreg)
τreg ::= reg1 t | reg8 t | reg16 t | reg32 t | reg64 t
Table 5.1: BIL Specification
as deobfuscation and optimization processing were all invoked as transformations on the BAP-lifted
intermediate representations. Specifically, they were each written as OCaml modules and run by
making modifications to the BAP iltrans tool.
Basic optimizations on the CFG/AST are performed: Cycles and unreachable nodes are removed
from the graphs and basic blocks which can be combined are coalesced. Furthermore, the CFG is
converted into a common compiler optimization-friendly format known as static single assignment
(SSA). In this form, each variable in the IR is guaranteed to only be assigned once.
Each relevant construct is specified before the tool is run, but must only be done once per
structure and can be used from then on, independent of specific protection-implementation details.
General pattern matching is applied recursively by iterating over the AST through standard OCaml
statements in accordance with the BAP AST specification.
The semantic extraction and identification is accomplished simultaneously considering the syntax
of the “signatures” written for each common structure and how OCaml types are utilized. When a
match is found it is generally checked for virtual code references using the constraint solver. Each
relevant vm-specific structure is a set variables in an OCaml expression and once the values are
obtained through pattern matching and semantic constraint solving they are passed to the next
step. The virtual code references are checked as described in Section 4.2.1. The constraint formulas
pertaining to the specific type of VM-identified are generated at run-time. Constraint solving is
done by exporting the formulas to STP [17] version 1373M.
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BB_Entry
/*entry node*/ 
BB_0
addr 0x401000 @asm "push   $0x0"
label pc_0x401000
T_t:u32 = 0:u32
R_ESP:u32 = R_ESP:u32 - 4:u32
mem:?u32 = mem:?u32 with [R_ESP:u32, e_little]:u32 = T_t:u32
BB_Exit
/*exit node*/ 
BB_Indirect
BB_Error
label BB_Error assert false 
BB_1
addr 0x401002 @asm "push   $0x403000"
label pc_0x401002
T_t_81:u32 = 0x403000:u32
R_ESP:u32 = R_ESP:u32 - 4:u32
mem:?u32 = mem:?u32 with [R_ESP:u32, e_little]:u32 = T_t_81:u32
BB_2
addr 0x401007 @asm "push   $0x403000"
label pc_0x401007
T_t_82:u32 = 0x403000:u32
R_ESP:u32 = R_ESP:u32 - 4:u32
mem:?u32 = mem:?u32 with [R_ESP:u32, e_little]:u32 = T_t_82:u32
BB_3
addr 0x40100c @asm "push   $0x0"
label pc_0x40100c
T_t_83:u32 = 0:u32
R_ESP:u32 = R_ESP:u32 - 4:u32
mem:?u32 = mem:?u32 with [R_ESP:u32, e_little]:u32 = T_t_83:u32
BB_5
addr 0x401013 @asm "push   $0x0"
label pc_0x401013
T_t_85:u32 = 0:u32
R_ESP:u32 = R_ESP:u32 - 4:u32
mem:?u32 = mem:?u32 with [R_ESP:u32, e_little]:u32 = T_t_85:u32
BB_7
addr 0x40101a @asm "jmp    *0x402000"
label pc_0x40101a
jmp mem:?u32[0x402000:u32, e_little]:u32
BB_8
addr 0x401020 @asm "jmp    *0x402008"
label pc_0x401020
jmp mem:?u32[0x402008:u32, e_little]:u32
BB_4
addr 0x40100e @asm "call   0x0000000000401020"
label pc_0x40100e
T_target:u32 = 0x401020:u32
R_ESP:u32 = R_ESP:u32 - 4:u32
mem:?u32 = mem:?u32 with [R_ESP:u32, e_little]:u32 = 0x401013:u32
jmp 0x401020:u32 @str "call"
BB_6
addr 0x401015 @asm "call   0x000000000040101a"
label pc_0x401015
T_target_86:u32 = 0x40101a:u32
R_ESP:u32 = R_ESP:u32 - 4:u32
mem:?u32 = mem:?u32 with [R_ESP:u32, e_little]:u32 = 0x40101a:u32
jmp 0x40101a:u32 @str "call"
Figure 5.1: Sample CFG of “Hello World!” program
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5.3 Back-End
As previously mentioned, at the end of the process, the user is presented with a report. The output
includes all relevant details regarding the VM-specifics that were analyzed. It shows any of the
code constructs found, VM type, suspected opcodes and accompanying handlers. There is also an
optional verbose mode, which outputs all computations, constraint formulas, and their solutions.
5.4 Challenges
We found that binaries packed by VMProtect had meta data that was, most-likely purposely, in-
correct. In particular, some of the fields in the PE header regarding the memory image size were
incorrect. The binaries lied about how big they were, claiming to be smaller than their actual size.
The PE/COFF specification [9] defines the format binaries on the Microsoft Windows platform must
follow. Because our system relies on these values in the default case, we had to manually input the
range of memory to analyze. This is not at all difficult to do, but one must notice the trick that
VMProtected binaries employ.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that in spite of BAP’s robustness there were several challenges
encountered, mostly with transformations done on the intermediate representation returned by BAP.
In particular BAP’s public release has problems with indirect jmp instructions such as jmp %eax
and the intermediate representation had some meta data which caused the representation to be
slightly imprecise and cumbersome. Both of these issues were dealt with by hand, doing some
processing and clean-up after the binaries were lifted, but before being processed by our modules.
There are also concerns in regards to BAP’s linear sweep disassembler. Disassembly is a sensitive
process due to the nature of binary code. It can be difficult to discern the separation of data and code.
If the point where the code evaluation begins is off by one single bit, the code can be interpreted
completely incorrectly relative to its intended meaning. Thus, we would have preferred to use
a recursive algorithm for disassembly since they are generally more resilient to anti-disassembly
tricks.
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Chapter 6
Results and Evaluation
6.1 Methodology
In order to evaluate our system, it was tested against three types of virtual-machine based protec-
tions: First, was a simple stack-based machine called StackVM, detailed in Appendix A, which we
wrote ourselves. Second, was a well-documented VM [2] written by a third party, popularized by a
“crackme”, which are essentially reverse engineering puzzles popular in the security, malware anal-
ysis, capture-the-flag, and reverse engineering communities. Third, we tested our system against a
popular commercial protector, often found packing malware in the wild, VMProtect [20]. Unfortu-
nately, because our system is more of an applied methodology, which results in a useful tool and
even forms somewhat of a framework, it is difficult to quantify its effectiveness. However, we will
discuss the varying levels of success on each set of binaries we tested it on. We also provide statistics
relevant for performance comparisons to alternative analysis systems and techniques.
6.2 StackVM
In analyzing the simplest VM, the one we developed ourselves, the system performed well. We
were able to extract all seventeen opcodes corresponding to the virtual instruction set and the
accompanying handler subroutines flawlessly, without false-positives. Each analysis of binaries of
this type only took on average 6.2 seconds. This is not surprising since the VM is so small. This
by itself is a very useful result because reverse engineering, even a simple VM like this, would take
orders of magnitude longer and be extremely tedious.
6.3 FuelVM
The analysis of the second VM that we tested was quite similar. We were again able to extract the
primary details particular to the VM implementation without any special modifications. However,
there was an imprecision in the way we determined potential opcodes. Due to the way the VM passes
operands, the code used to decode them is typically recognized as part of the opcode decoding. This
can be handled by specifying exceptions particular to this implemention. It is worth noting that
while the VM-context is very similar to StackVM with respect to the virtual instruction book-
keeping, in the decode-step, there was another temporary memory address which held a copy of the
VM-bytecode, but it was handled without issue. The analyses on this VM took on average 18.6
seconds.
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Another aspect of this particular implementation worth noting is the presence of anti-debugging
measures. At the start of the program a custom structured exception handler (SEH) frame is created
and added to the SEH chain. An exception is then triggered by an int 3 instruction, which triggers
an interrupt meant to trap to a system’s debugger. If a debugger is not attached, this causes the
exception handler that was just added to the SEH chain to gain control. Disassembly of the first
custom SEH is shown in Figure 6.1.
.text:004012D7 customSEH1:
.text:004012D7 pop large dword ptr fs:0
.text:004012DE add esp, 4
.text:004012E1 push offset customSEH2
.text:004012E6 push large dword ptr fs:0
.text:004012ED mov large fs:0, esp
.text:004012F4 mov eax, 1
.text:004012F9 xor ecx, ecx
.text:004012FB div ecx
.text:004012FD xor eax, eax
.text:004012FF mul ecx
Figure 6.1: Custom SEH1
The SEH chain is a linked list that is used when an exception occurs. Each exception handler in
the chain is called in succession until the exception is dealt with or the end of the chain is reached;
fs:0 refers to the beginning of the SEH chain and the first member of the data structure known as
the Thread Information Block (TIB), which is specific to Windows. In the first custom SEH an
exception is triggered by zeroing out ecx and attempting a division operation. This causes a divide
by zero exception. There are two more custom SEH’s chained together by the VM as a means to
thwart dynamic-analysis in the form of a debugger because if you attach a debugger the exceptions
will not reach the custom handlers, and execution will be interrupted. Since our tool is purely static
this was not an issue at all.
6.4 VMProtect
In the case of the binaries packed with VMProtect, we were able to perform our analysis, but with
a few modifications. The main modifications needed to analyze VMProtected binaries comes from
their use of an indirect jmp instruction in their dispatcher’s decoding step. The current version of
BAP (0.7) has issues dealing with indirect jmp′s, so we had to implement a workaround specifically
for this case. In a related note, because the opcodes are actually used in calculating the jmp target
as seen in Figure 4.7, where eax contains the bytecode and is multiplied by four to get the offset
into the handler functions’ jmp-table, the opcode identification is actually relatively simple when
compared to the other VM’s we looked at in this paper. Due to this simplicity, coupled with the
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modifications needed, it is not quite fair to compare analysis times for this VM, but it was very
quick, on the order of seconds. We used the trial version of VMProtect Ultimate v2.12 on Windows
XP for all VMProtect-related experiments and analysis.
6.5 Virtual Code Independence
Due to the design of our system. The analysis of the VM-obfuscated binaries is relatively independent
of the virtual code that will be interpreted. This is because the bulk of the analysis focuses on
reverse engineering the details of the VM itself and its interpreter. This means that the run-time
performance of our system should not increase by very much as the size of the virtual program
increases. It is also very contrary to what would happen in the case of a dynamic analysis system,
which must execute and analyze the entirety of the virtualized code. To test this, we performed
our analysis on programs with varying lengths of bytecode within StackVM executables. We used
bytecode programs of lengths: 42, 142, 542, and 1042 bytecode instructions. We followed a similar
procedure for VMProtect. However, because VMProtect is commercial software, it was more difficult
to precisely control the size of the vm-bytecode. Instead, we varied the size of the executables that
we packed with VMProtect. We tested a toy ”Hello World!” program of size 2.5KB, and several
Windows XP utilities from C:\WINDOWS\system32: notepad.exe (67.5KB), calc.exe (112KB), and
cmd.exe (380KB). In all cases the affect on run-time was negligible.
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Chapter 7
Future Work
This paper is meant to provide a methodology for developing an automated system for statically
analyzing binaries protected by virtual-machine obfuscators with an emphasis on efficiency and
accessibility. The system we developed is meant to be a proof of concept for this approach. That
being said, there are a number of improvements left for future work.
As mentioned in Section 5.4, a difficulty we faced involved the framework we built upon hav-
ing some issues with certain instructions, most notably indirect jmp’s. This caused quite a few
problems, which we had to develop work-arounds for, but we hope future versions will solve those
issues. Whether developers introduce solutions in later revisions, we write patches ourselves, or if
we find other means, support for these kinds of instructions should greatly improve the efficiency
and generality of our system.
There was a problem we encountered when analyzing VMProtected binaries involving the PE
header fields lying about the binary. We could solve this in the future by calculating values such as
the size of the image manually instead of relying on the values in the header fields.
We also would like to increase the catalog of common structures that we are able to identify and
analyze. Right now our system is only able to deal with the most common cases: a standard fetch-
decode-execute workflow and a few different decoding schemes. A wider breadth of capabilities would
make our system much more robust. Similarly, more post-processing modules should be written to
deal with different kinds of obfuscation schemes and to remove different VM-implementation specific
features where possible.
Finally, we would like to eventually add support for full-code generation and recompilation after
the post-processing transformations. This would allow a working executable to be output that could
be loaded into other tools which take binary executables as input.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
The analysis of Virtual-Machine packed binaries is typically a very challenging task. There have
been attempts to develop dynamic-analysis tools to aide in their reverse-engineering. However, these
systems suffer from many performance and run-time issues. Typically, a very skilled individual must
reverse-engineer each new implementation of a VM-Packer from scratch, by hand, through mostly
static means such as looking through an interactive disassembler. This process is expensive, time-
consuming, and tedious.
We have successfully developed a system as alternative to previous methods. It is meant to
provide automated, purely-static-analysis of Virtual-Machine protected binaries in a manner that
is more efficient than pure manual analysis. This is accomplished by reusing analysis of common
structures, leveraging semantics of processed instructions, and reducing some of the tedium of re-
peating the same analysis, either on the same binary or on several different binaries, by invoking a
programmatic solution. It is also faster and more complete then dynamic-analysis alone. By keeping
the analysis confined to static techniques, we are able to avoid many pitfalls that dynamic-analysis
systems fall into. These include anti-execution, anti-debugging, and anti-virtualization tricks. The
system is also able to analyze entire executables as a whole without relying on the execution of
singular code paths. Our system is able to extract several features of current VM protections on an
extensible platform that is accessible to even novice analysts. It was evaluated by analyzing three
separate VM-protections: a simple VM we developed, a third-party VM, and a commercial protec-
tion scheme. This work shows that an approach such as ours, is capable of efficiently analyzing even
the most advanced protection schemes.
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Appendix A
StackVM
StackVM is a small stack-based VM that we developed for testing. It has seventeen virtual instruc-
tions and maintains two virtual registers and a virtual stack. The instructions are stored in a data
block to which a virtual offset is kept track of. Virtual instruction decoding is handled by a simple
switch-like structure. It is implemented in MASM and the primary code is listed below:
.386
.model flat, stdcall
assume fs:flat
option casemap :none
include \masm32\include\windows.inc
include \masm32\include\kernel32.inc
include \masm32\include\user32.inc
includelib \masm32\lib\kernel32.lib
includelib \masm32\lib\user32.lib
COMMENT /
Stack VM - A Simple stack-based VM
2KB stack and stack offset vsp
2 general purpose registers: r0, r1
program counter: vpc
ISA:
0x01 vpush r0
0x02 vpop r0
0x03 vmov r0, r1
0x04 vmov r1, r0
0x05 vmov r0, imm16
0x06 vadd r0, r1
0x07 vsub r0, r1 ; r0 = r0-r1
0x08 vand r0, r1
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0x09 vor r0, r1
0x0A vxor r0, r1
0x0B vxchg r0, r1
0x0C vjeq offset
0x0D vja offset
0xFE vnop
0xFF exit
/
.data
input db "StackVM Exiting.", 0
correct db "Correct!", 0
incorrect db "Incorrect!", 0
code db 05h, 0CDh, 0ABh ; mov r0, 0xABCD
db 01h ; push r0
db 05h, 011h, 011h ; mov r0, 0x1111
db 04h ; mov r1, r0
db 05h, 088h, 088h ; mov r0, 0x8888
db 07h ; sub r0, r1
db 04h ; mov r1, r0
db 02h ; pop r0
db 0bh ; xchg r0, r1
db 01h ; push r0
db 0FEh ; nop
db 05h, 08h, 0 ; mov r0, 8
db 04h ; mov r1, r0
db 05h, 2Fh, 13h ; mov r0, 0x133F
db 03h ; add r0, r1
db 0Ch, 1, 0; jeq 1
db 0FDh ; incorrect
db 0FCh ; correct
db 04h ; mov r1, r0
db 05h, 038h, 13h ; mov r0, 0x1338
db 0Dh, 3, 0; ja 3
db 0FDh ; incorrect
db 0FEh ; nop
db 0FFh ; exit
db 0FCh ; correct
db 0FFh, 0 ; exit
; VM State
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stack db 65536 DUP(?) ; 2^16
vsp dw 0FFFFh ; VM stack pointer
vpc dw 0 ; VM instruction pointer
vr0 dw 0 ; general purpose register 0
vr1 dw 0 ; general purpose register 1
.code
start:
lea esi, code ; fetch code[vpc]
xor ecx, ecx
mov cx, [vpc]
add esi, ecx
mov al, [esi]
.IF al == 01h
call vpush
.ELSEIF al == 02h
call vpop
.ELSEIF al == 03h
call vmov01
.ELSEIF al == 04h
call vmov10
.ELSEIF al == 05h
call vmovimm
.ELSEIF al == 06h
call vadd
.ELSEIF al == 07h
call vsub
.ELSEIF al == 08h
call vand
.ELSEIF al == 09h
call vor
.ELSEIF al == 0Ah
call vxor
.ELSEIF al == 0Bh
call vxchg
.ELSEIF al == 0Ch
call vjeq
.ELSEIF al == 0Dh
call vja
.ELSEIF al == 0FCh
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invoke MessageBox, NULL, addr correct, addr correct, MB_OK
.ELSEIF al == 0FDh
invoke MessageBox, NULL, addr incorrect, addr incorrect, MB_OK
.ELSEIF al == 0FEh
call vnop
.ELSEIF al == 0FFh
invoke MessageBox, NULL, addr input, addr input, MB_OK
invoke ExitProcess, 0
.ENDIF
add word ptr[vpc], 1
jmp start
vpush:
sub vsp, 2 ; decrement stack pointer
; mov ax, [esp+4]
mov ax, [vr0]
lea ebx, stack
xor edi, edi
mov di, vsp
add edi, ebx
mov word ptr[edi], ax
ret
vpop:
lea ebx, stack
xor edi, edi
mov di, vsp
add edi, ebx
mov ax, [edi]
mov word ptr[vr0], ax
add vsp, 2
ret
vmov01:
mov ax, [vr1]
mov word ptr [vr0], ax
ret
vxchg:
mov ax, [vr0]
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mov bx, [vr1]
mov word ptr [vr1], ax
mov word ptr [vr0], bx
ret
vmov10:
mov ax, [vr0]
mov word ptr [vr1], ax
ret
vmovimm:
add word ptr[vpc], 1
lea esi, code ; fetch code[vpc]
xor ecx, ecx
mov cx, [vpc]
add word ptr[vpc], 1
add esi, ecx
xor edx, edx
mov dx, [esi]
mov word ptr [vr0], dx
ret
vadd:
mov ax, [vr0]
add ax, [vr1]
mov word ptr [vr0], ax
ret
vsub:
mov ax, [vr0]
sub ax, [vr1]
mov word ptr [vr0], ax
ret
vand:
mov ax, [vr0]
and ax, [vr1]
mov word ptr [vr0], ax
ret
vor:
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mov ax, [vr0]
or ax, [vr1]
mov word ptr [vr0], ax
ret
vxor:
mov ax, [vr0]
xor ax, [vr1]
mov word ptr [vr0], ax
ret
vnop:
call vmov01
call vmov01
ret
vja:
add word ptr[vpc], 1
mov ax, [vr0]
mov bx, [vr1]
cmp ax, bx
jna end_ja
lea esi, code ; fetch code[vpc]
xor ecx, ecx
mov cx, [vpc]
add esi, ecx
xor edx, edx
mov dx, [esi]
add word ptr [vpc], dx
end_ja:
add word ptr[vpc], 1
ret
vjeq:
add word ptr[vpc], 1
mov ax, [vr0]
mov bx, [vr1]
cmp ax, bx
jne end_jeq
lea esi, code ; fetch code[vpc]
xor ecx, ecx
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mov cx, [vpc]
add esi, ecx
xor edx, edx
mov dx, [esi]
add word ptr [vpc], dx
end_jeq:
add word ptr[vpc], 1
ret
end start
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